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Abstract— Security is a demanding challenge in wireless systems due to the broadcast nature
of the channel. One the other hand security at physical layer can increase overall system’s
security since it can be combined with other security schemes from higher layers. High throughput
required by modern wireless networks can be assured by MIMO (Multiple-input multiple-output),
but when high spectral efficiencies are needed multilevel modulations with high peak-to-average
power ratios should be used, which may affect efficiency of power amplification. This problem
can be avoided by the MISO (Multi input Single Output) transmitter considered here, where
transmitted multilevel constellations are the result of the combination of several uncorrelated
BPSK (Bi-Phase Shift Keying) components, that are amplified and transmitted independently
by an antenna. The constellation shaping done by this transmitter means directivity in the
transmitted constellation that can be used to assure security at physical layer. Security as
well complexity are assured since any eavesdropper must know the set of coefficients associated
to each BPSK component as well as the antenna array configuration. It is shown that the
inherent security assured by this transmitter allows secrecy at physical layer. Several examples
are analyzed and the corresponding results show the effectiveness of the proposed approach to
implement a security scheme at physical layer level.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile communication systems must support multiple users achieving at same time privacy of
users contents. Moreover, the broadcast nature of wireless channel makes it even more demanding
any security solution. It is well known that common security solutions are based on encrypted
algorithms from higher layers, such as private and public encrypted keys [1–3]. One advantage of
physical layer security schemes relies on the fact that they may be combined with other schemes from
higher layers to increase overall security. Coding or channel state information can be used to assure
physical security. However, these approaches compromise spectral efficiency or are inadequate for
static channels. For these reasons, it is desirable a physical security scheme without coding and
independent of channel state information, where security is achieved trough constellation mappings
and shaping for specific directions that are introduced at transmitter level.
MIMO (Multiple-input multiple-output) as well as MISO (Multiple Input single Output) systems
can increase throughput in modern wireless networks and reduce interference [4]. Other advantage
of MIMO systems is the reduction of the transmitted power. On the other hand, high spectral
efficiency is only attainable by multilevel modulations characterized by high peak-to-average power
ratios (PARP), which may affect efficiency of power amplification. This problem can be avoided with
a transmission scheme, where the constellations are decomposed on several uncorrelated BPSK (Bi-
Phase Shift Keying), QPSK (Quadri Phase Shift Keying) or OQPSK (Offset QPSK) components,
being each component amplified and transmitted independently by an antenna [5, 6]. This approach
also avoids combination losses since the several signal components are combined at channel level.
Security is also assured, since the constellation shaping introduced by the MISO transmitter means
that we have directivity at the constellation level that can be employed to assure security at
physical layer [7]. Therefore, the inherent security lies on the constellation directivity, i.e., in the
direction in which the constellation is optimized, which can be improved by changes on coefficients’
phases or using constellations that are decomposed with an higher number of BPSK components.
High computational complexity associated to interception is also achieved because each user must
know the set of coefficients associated to the BPSK components as well as the array configuration,
otherwise receives useless data. Moreover, the security implemented in this case do not compromises
spectral efficiency and it is also independent of channel sate variability. The several cases analyzed
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here show effectiveness of the proposed approach to implement a security scheme at physical layer
level.
This work explores a multi-antenna transmission technique as a physical layer security technique
independent of channel characteristics. In Section 2 a revision of the transmitter technique is
made. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: considerations about the security achieved
and complexity are presented in Section 3. A analysis of security and a set of simulation results
are also presented in this Section. Section 4 resumes this paper.
2. MISO TRANSMITTER AND CONFIGURATIONS HYPOTHESIS
The basic idea is to employ a transmitter structure where the transmitted constellation (for exam-
ple a M-QAM (Quadrature Amplitude Modulation)) is the result of the combination at channel
level of Nm constant envelope signals that are amplified by Nm nonlinear amplifiers before being
transmitted by Nm antennas. This avoids combination losses and increases efficiency of power
amplification, since the outputs of the Nm amplifiers are combined at the channel and it is possible
to use nonlinear (NL) amplifiers in each radio frequency (RF) branch [5, 6]. Figure 1 shows the
structure of such transmitter, where firstly the data bits are mapped into a given constellation (e.g.,
a QAM constellation) characterized by the ordered set S = {s0, s1, . . . , sM−1} following the rule
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with (γµ,i γµ−1,i . . . γ2,i γ1,i) denoting the binary representation of i and b
(m)
n = (−1)β(m)n is
the polar representation of the bit β(m)n . Since we have M constellation symbols in S and M
complex coefficients gi, (1) is a system of M equations that can be used to obtain the coefficients
gi, i = 0, 1, . . . ,M−1. In practice, a given constellation can be decomposed as the sum of Nm ≤M
polar components, since g0 = 0 (which represents the center of mass of the constellation) and other
gi can also be 0 [8]. Each one of theNm polar components is modulated as a BPSK signal, being each
one a serial representation of an OQPSK signal [9], with reduced envelope fluctuations and compact
spectrum (e.g., a gaussian minimum shift keying (GMSK) signal). Finally, the corresponding signals
are separately amplified by Nm nonlinear amplifiers and posteriorly transmitted by Nm antennas.
Despite the uncorrelation between BPSK components, there is directivity at information level since
the transmitted constellation shape is optimized for a specific angle Θ. So, security arises as a
consequence of constellation shaping, since any unauthorized user must know the constellation
coefficients gi as well as the array configuration to decode with success the transmitted data.
Another important aspect is the complexity associated to any interception. In this case, complexity
relies on the several configuration freedom degrees that are possible at the transmitter. Mappings
cab be changed by setting different values to the set of coefficients gi or changing association between
BPSK components and transmit antennas. For example, assuming the a equal number of active
antennas and BPSK components, i.e., Nm components, the number of possible configurations will
be log2(M)! × (Nm! − Nm), where NNmm ! − Nm denote the number of different permutations of
coefficients gi between antennas. Moreover, if the array have M antennas with only Nm active,
the number of permutations is given by M !/((M −Nm)!Nm!) which leads to the total number of
combinations log 2(M)!M !/((M −Nm)!Nm!). Actually, the number of possibilities is higher since
we must take into account the directions in which the constellation can be optimized (Θ ∈ [0, 2pi])
and also the spacing between antennas.
3. SECURITY LEVEL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
To characterize the security achieved by this scheme we consider the simplest scenario with a
three-terminal system comprising a transmitter, the intended receiver, and an unauthorized re-
ceiver (eavesdropper), wherein the transmitter wishes to communicate a private message to the
receiver. Having in mind the the analysis of the secrecy level assured by this transmission scheme
and the tolerance against errors on the estimation of transmitter’s parameters (closely related with
the complexity), the mutual information (MI) associated to both authorized receiver and eaves-
dropper will be evaluated. For this purpose, we assume that the authorized receiver knows the
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Figure 1: Structure of constellation directive transmitter.
transmitter coefficients gi. Regarding the eavesdropper we admit two possibilities: in the first one
the eavesdropper do not have any information about gi and array configuration. In the second the
configuration parameters associated to the constellation optimized for the angle Θ are known, but
the eavesdropper is unable to estimate the exact coefficients gi and the array configuration that
lead to an new optimization angle Θ +∆Θ).
Despite the variety of possible parameters that can be changed in the configuration of this
transmitter, we restrict our analysis to transmitters with equal number of antennas and BPSK
components and an uniform spacing between antennas equal to d/λ = 1/4. We assume an non-
degraded Gaussian wiretap channel, where both channels are Additive White Gaussian (AWGN)
channels.
Let s(t) denote the nth transmitted symbol associated to a given block
s(t) = snhT (t− nTS), (2)
with TS denoting the symbol duration and hT (t) denoting the adopted pulse shape. sn belongs to a
given size-M constellation S. The received signals by the authorized receiver and the eavesdropper
are
y(t) = fA(s(t)) + n1(t), (3)
and
z(t) = fA(s(t)) + n2(t), (4)
with n1(t) and n2(t) denoting de noise terms and fA denotes the shaping performed by the trans-
mitter array. It is well known that perfect secrecy implies that I(S;Z) = 0, with S the sent message
and Z the received message by the eavesdropper and where I(; ) denotes mutual information. It
should be noted that the mutual information (assuming equiprobable symbols) for a given signal
set S gives the maximum transmission rate (in bits/channel use) at which error-free transmission
is possible with such signal set [10], and can be written as
I(S, Y )− log2M −
1
M
∑
s∈S
En
log2
∑
s′n∈S
exp(− 1
N0
|
√
Es(sn − s′n) + n|2 − |n|2)
 , (5)
where E denotes the expectation. It can be shown that the secrecy capacity is given by the difference
of mutual informations
Cs = max
s∈F
[I(S;Y )− I(S;Z)] (6)
where F is the set of all probability density functions at the channel input under power constrain
at the transmitter, I(S;Y ) denotes the mutual information of the intended receiver and I(S;Z)
represents the mutual information of eavesdropper. It is important to recall that when coefficients
gi are not known the distortion effects on the transmitted constellation are comparable to nonlinear
distortion introduced by a nonlinear channel with a AM/AM and a AM/PM non null characteristic.
Therefore, we can expect a null MI value for the case where there is no information about transmitter
configuration available for the eavesdropper.
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3.1. Simulation Results
For MI computation we consider average results based on independent trials of Monte Carlo ex-
periments. Also the symbols sn are selected with equal probability from a M -QAM constellation
(dimensions of M = 16 and M = 64 are considered). The transmitter based on 16-QAM with gray
mapping is characterized by the set of non null coefficients g34 = 2j, g1 = 1, g3 = 2 and g12 = j,
associated to the antennas 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. For 64-QAM we have is 6 non-null coeffi-
cients with values 2j, 1, 2, j, 4 and 4j associated to the antennas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
Results are expressed as function of EbN0 , where N0/2 is the noise variance and Eb is the energy of
the transmitted bits. In the second hypothesis the ∆Θ values are 6◦ and 8◦. Only for comparison
purposes and to see what is the effect of an higher number of RF branches on secrecy capacity in
second hypotheses, we consider also a Voronoi constellation with 16 symbols characterized by the
set of complex coefficients g0 = 0, g1 = −0.58+ j0.57, g2 = −0.712+ j0.545, g3 = −0.014− j0.124,
g4 = 0.028 + j0.248, g5 = −0.186 + j0.273, g6 = −0.2 + j0.149, g7 = −0.014 − j0.124, g8 =
−0.1+ j0.074, g9 = 0.085− j0.198, g10 = 0.358+ j0.272, g11 = 0.859− j0.198, g12 = −0.1+ j0.074,
g13 = −0.085 − j0.198, g14 = −0.1 + j0.074 and g15 = 0.085 − j0.198 (Voronoi constellations are
optimized to assure the best energy efficiency).
Figure 2 shows MI behavior with the optimization angle θ for transmitters using 4 and 6 RF
branches, i.e., for 16-QAM and 64-QAM constellations, respectively. It can be seen that when
the intended receiver knows the transmitter parameters the MI is practically unaffected by the
optimization angle in which the constellation is configured. This means that, independently of Θ,
the authorized receiver is able to decode with success the transmitted data.
Figure 2: MI behavior with the transmission direction θ for the authorized user.
It should be mentioned that, when no information about transmitter configuration is available
at the eavesdropper, the MI value is always null (under these conditions the eavesdropper assumes
a regular M-QAM constellation with gray mapping, and is unable to compensate the nonlinear
distortion due to the constellation shaping). This is shown in the results of Figure 3, regarding
the secrecy evolution with EbN0 , where it can be seen that the secrecy capacity equals the mutual
information of the authorized receiver. In this case the MI values agree with the secrecy capacity.
Figures 4 and 5 show the results regarding the second hypothesis, where the eavesdropper knows
the initial set of parameters associated to the optimized constellation for angle Θ, but is unable to
accurately estimate the associated parameters in a new direction Θ +∆Θ. Clearly, the MI for the
eavesdropper is severely affected when is unable to estimate the angle Θ + ∆Θ. As expected, the
higher number of RF branches implies stronger impact on MI values. This is valid for 16-Voronoi
constellation where the secrecy is practically equal to the results of Figure 3 (in this case the MI for
the eavesdropper is near zero). The same conclusion is valid for 64-QAM as we can see from Figure 5
(the 64-Voronoi was not included since our previous analysis showed that the effect on secrecy rate
is similar to 16-Voronoi). Therefore, the resort to constellations requiring more BPSK components
implies lower tolerance to estimation errors. This is good since it means high complexity in the
computational process to estimate the transmitter parameters by any eavesdropper.
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Figure 3: Secrecy rate for 16-QAM and 64-QAM
when only the information about the set of gi co-
efficients is available to the eavesdropper.
Figure 4: Secrecy rate for 16-QAM and 16-Voronoi
for the second hypothesis about eavesdropper.
Figure 5: Secrecy rate for 64-QAM and 16-Voronoi for the second hypothesis about eavesdropper.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we considered constellation shaping achieved by a MISO transmission structure as a
technique to implement physical layer security. The basic idea relies on the fact that the constella-
tion shaping performed for a specific direction Θ can be used to assure secrecy on communication.
The several freedom degrees regarding the configuration of transmitter lead to complexity levels
that makes very difficult any successful interception by an eavesdropper. These assumptions were
confirmed by a set of simulation results where it was possible to see the good level of secrecy at-
tainable by these kind of transmitters. Notwithstanding the analysis and results presented here,
a full characterization of the secrecy attainable by this transmitter should be addressed in future
work.
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